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Abstract - The use of Network Address Translation (NAT) has 
greatly expanded in recent years. While originally an address 
management technique it has often been used for security. 
However, there are many implementations of NAT that are 
inherently insecure. Recently investigation into some of these 
has shown increased potential for security holes in NAT 
deployments. An understanding of the risks associated with 
NAT and the basic networking topics supporting a research in 
this area are critical to an information assurance student. This 
paper describes the basic operation of NAT, outlines one such 
security problem and its’ mitigation, develops a testing 
methodology for use in information security curricula and 
suggests topics to be covered for student success. 
Keywords: Computer network security education, Address 
Translation, NAT  
 
1 Introduction 
 With continued dependence on limited IPv4 addressing 
and the proliferation of network address translation (NAT) 
devices, it is important to understand the security risks 
associated with using these components in your network. This 
may be particularly true for SOHO environments that 
commonly deploy inexpensive solutions and users may not 
have the expertise to determine risks or properly configure 
these devices. It is just as important that information 
security/assurance curricula include a study of these 
vulnerabilities and the underlying networking concepts that 
facilitate a complete understanding of the situation. This paper 
will explain the basic operation of NAT, address some of 
these security issues, outline some of the experiments 
completed and offer methodologies for including these 
experiments in any curriculum. To make this available to the 
widest array of educational institutions, the test were done in 
both virtual and non-virtual environments. 
2 What is NAT? 
 Translation is the process by which an internal, private 
address is converted to an external public address. Some or all 
of the traffic leaving the internal network will have the IP 
header of the packets modified before leaving the external 
interface of edge NAT device. This process is described in the 
original request for comments or RFC [1]. Associated with 
this document is RFC 1597 which describes private 
addressing. Three address ranges are removed from the public 
IP address space: 
Table I 
Private Address Ranges 
Private Address Ranges 
192.168.0.0/24 
172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255/16 
10.0.0.0/8 [2] 
 
 Note that the address space defined is extremely limited. 
While this RFC does not address NAT specifically, network 
address translators use these addresses for internal hosts. As 
transmissions are routed in the outbound direction, the source 
IP address from one of these address ranges is modified to be 
that of the outside interface of the NAT device. When using a 
single NAT device, this outside address will be part of the 
public address space of the Internet. Upon returning, the 
translation process is done in reverse. Critical to this process is 
the translation table maintained on the NAT device. This table 
maintains the mapping between the original inside source IP 
address and port to the outside address and port assigned by 
the NAT device. 
 It is important to realize that in addition to this translation, 
the NAT device is handling routing functions. In SOHO 
networks these devices are also known as home gateways. 
They can be deployed as stub networks or provide routing for 
larger topologies using routing protocols such as RIP. 
2.1 The Problem 
 Though the RFCs indicate that NAT is an address 
management technique, it is often relied upon to be a security 
tool. This is because all of the internal private transmissions 
appear to have come from a single outside public address. 
Terms like “cloaking” are sometimes used. While it is true that 
the internal addresses are to some extent “invisible”, RFC1631 
points out several flaws (ex. addresses included in some 
application headers) in this assumption. In addition, NAT can 
also make security deployments difficult because of the 
changes to the IP header or trouble supporting VPN protocols. 
Running servers behind NAT routers may require ports to be 
opened up through the device. Nevertheless, we see the 
continued use of NAT devices for both purposes (address 
management and security) with the supposition that the 
internal network is protected. 
 A recent IEEE Network Magazine article points out that 
many are under the mistaken belief that device running NAT 
will suffice as an effective firewall. This is simply not true. 
Compounding these problems is the fact that because we have 
had so many changes to the applications run on a network, 
there have been a corresponding number of NAT traversal 
mechanisms deployed with the goal of running contemporary 
applications seamlessly. This has the very real potential of 
further degrading NAT device security. [2] 
 Many SOHO networks are entirely dependent on home class 
gateways such as CISCO/Linksys/NetGear routers to handle 
the routing and translation. With the increase in online 
gaming, social networking and file sharing, NAT boxes are 
being asked to do even more than just routing. No longer is it 
sufficient to provide port forwarding and port triggering; NAT 
boxes are now being configured to be peer-to-peer application 
friendly. This can serve to open up more holes to the internal 
network.  
 In addition to the RFCs’ security concerns, flaws in network 
device operating systems and in basic translation behaviour 
may create greater security problems. We will outline one 
such problem and run a series of tests against an experimental 
topology seeking to circumvent the privacy allegedly afforded 
by the NAT device. The topology will be typical of many 
deployments and tested in both virtual and non-virtual 
environments. For the non-virtual tests we used Cisco and 
Linksys equipment. This will provide a representative sample 
for both SOHO and more advanced networking equipment. 
For the virtual tests we used VMware and a VMware virtual 
router called VYATTA. The configurations of these devices 
will be explained in the next couple of sections. 
2.2 The Experiment 


















 In this diagram there are three networks separated by a pair 
of routers. For the purposes of the test, we considered R1 to be 
the edge of the home or private network. This topology was 
built in order to test a particular vulnerability when running 
NAT and the premise that the network behind the NAT router 
is invisible. Our question: Can the internal network be reached 
by taking advantage of the basic translation/routing behaviour 
without compromising the NAT device itself? 
 A typical router will consult its routing table whenever it 
receives a packet. If the packet is destined for a network 
directly attached to the router, it is simply forwarded out of the 
associated interface. However, if the destination is not on a 
network directly attached, or if it is unknown, then the router 
forwards the packet to either a next hop or its’ own default 
gateway, similar to a host. 
 Our supposition is that knowledge of the private, 
unadvertised network in use behind the NAT device could be 
used to compromise the private address space. Once a host or 
router on the outside was given a route to that private network 
via the outside interface of the NAT device, the NAT router 
would complete the routing without having to perform an 
attack on the device. This is contrary to the understood 
behavior of the NAT device preventing all uninitiated traffic 
from the outside. 
2.3 Learning the Inside Network 
 For this experiment to work, we had to be able to 
configure R2 with information about the inside network; 
network A. So the question is, how do we get this 
information? The reality is that attackers do not have to work 
very hard to learn the address of the internal network. The 
default characteristics of many NAT devices (such as IP 
addressing) are well known to the online community. An 
example of this can be seen in [3]. In addition, any wireless 
network running behind the NAT device would potentially 
advertise these addresses making them available via simple 
packet capture or through the use of a program like 
NetStumbler. The wireless port is in the same layer 2 network 
as the wired nodes in a device like a Linksys gateway. 
Advertisements or traffic between the wireless node and the 
gateway will use the same network addressing as the wired 
nodes. Scanning tools like Nmap and Nessus allow us to 
automate searches for potential targets and pinging a range of 
addresses until you are successful will also work. Finally, 
there are a limited number of private addresses specified in the 
RFCs and so the entire range can be tested. 
 The outside address of the NAT device is also able to be 
obtained via packet capture (depending on the network) or a 
fairly straight-forward scan of the network. Access is often 
simple as many companies provide network jacks in their 
common areas or conference rooms. Any organization 
providing free Wi-Fi is willing to allow a certain amount of 
access to their network as well. Once the gateway or outside 
interface of the NAT device is known, the attacker then 
adjusts the routing table of the next hop router – R2. Thus, this 
entire set of scenarios and tests described here could be 
accomplished via methods that are, or very nearly are, 
completely passive. These methods also require very little 
technical ability beyond an understanding of routing and NAT. 
2.4 Routing in the Topology 
 The routing table of R1, Table 2, shows that it is directly 
connected to networks A and B, while R2 is directly 
connected to networks B and C. R1 is also running NAT. To 
complete the setup, R1 is given a default route to R2. This 
emulates a typical router configuration for a stub network. 
Table II 
Initial Routing Tables for R1 & R2 
Router R1 (NAT) Router R2 
Connected: network A 
Connected: network B 
Gateway = R2 
Connected: network B 
Connected: network C 
 
 In the case of a SOHO network, the outside interface (WAN 
port) is commonly a DHCP client and will obtain its’ IP 
address and the address of the default router from the ISP 
network. This insulates the home user from having to know 
information about the ISP network when doing initial setup. 
Similarly, a router such as a Cisco 2621 acting as R1 must be 
given a default route to the next router. In this case, the 2621 
is not usually a DHCP client. 
2.5 The Scenarios 
 What follows is a discussion of the four separate scenarios 
run on this topology (in both physical and virtual 









Test Scenarios Employed 
Test Scenario 
1 Both R1 and R2 are Cisco 2621 routers. IOS 
version 12.3 
2 R1 is a Linksys router, R2 is a Cisco 2621 router. 
3 R1 is implemented using VMware’s built-in NAT 
service. R2 is a VYATTA virtual machine running 
in VMware. 
4 Both R1 and R2 are VYATTA virtual routers, R1 is 
configured with NAT. 
 
 Note that in all cases, while both R1 and R2 are providing 
routing services, only R1 is running NAT. There were three 
different test cases run against each one of these scenarios; 
Table IV 
Test Case Descriptions 
Test Activity 
1 Simple routing from network C to network A (R2 to 
R1) 
2 Default routing from a host on network B (the host 
default route points to R1) 
3 Redirection for a host on network B to network A 
via R2. The gateway for the host is R2. 
 These tests are different aspects of the same question: Will 
R1 forward traffic to network A when it receives a request on 
the outside interface even though the internal network is 
supposed to be invisible? 
 For test 1, the routing tables were manipulated as follows: 
Table V 
Test 1 Routing Tables for R1 & R2 
Router R1 (NAT) Router R2 
Connected: network A 
Connected: network B 
Gateway = R2 
Connected: network B 
Connected: network C 
Network A via R1 
 
 This modification tells R2 that in order to reach network A, 
it must send the traffic to the outside interface of R1. 
 In test 2, we do not actually have to know anything about 
the internal network. This is simply configuring an outside 
host to use the outside interface of R1 as its’ default gateway. 
This is contrary to normal configuration because we typically 
want the default route to point in the direction of a majority of 
possible destinations. 
 Test 3 tests redirection. An ICMP redirect is generated when 
there is a better path to the destination than the one originally 
used. There are three requirements for a redirect; no source 
route information, the new forwarding router must be 
“reachable” by the source host and the original router must 
have to forward the message out of the same interface it came 
in on. In this case, the router routing tables are modified as in 
test 1. The message flow starts as a request from a host on 
network B. The host sends this request to R2. R2 processes 
its’ routing table and forwards the traffic back over to R1 and 
generates an ICMP redirect to the source host. From that point 
on, the host forwards traffic for the internal network (network 
A) to R1 only. 
2.6 Configurations 
 The Cisco routers were running a basic form of NAT 
specifying the following; inside and outside interfaces, an 
ACL describing the inside network and a NAT statement 
telling the router to translate the inside network to the outside 
IP address. In this case, the purpose of the ACL was to 
indicate which addresses were to be translated. The pertinent 




 ip address 
ip nat inside 
interface f0/1 
 ip address 
 ip nat outside 
ip nat inside source list 1 interface f0/1 overload 
 access-list 1 permit inside network 
 
 
 The Linksys router was using a default configuration, 
providing translation for outgoing traffic and acting as a 
DHCP server for the inside hosts. The Linksys was receiving 
the IP information for its’ WAN connection from R2 which 
was acting as a DHCP server. 
 For scenarios 3 & 4, we downloaded VYATTA and 
Backtrack3 (a Linux Live distribution) virtual machines. We 
required three hosts, one for each network. After renaming 
Backtrack3 to INSIDE we created two linked clones and 
renamed them OUTSIDE and DISTANT. We also required 
two routers and so after renaming VYATTA to R1, we created 
a linked clone and renamed it R2.  VMware’s Player and 
Server are free making the cost of this exercise minimal. 
 The VMware NAT router is an included resource in the 
VMware line of virtualization products.  It performs the NAT 
function between a virtual network (typically VMnet8) and the 
VMware host’s outside network connection. The VMware 
host on which the virtual machines run also implements the 
virtual networks that interconnect the routes and hosts. 
 There are three types of network connections provided by 
VMware; Bridged to a physical NIC, NAT, and host only 
private network. Virtual machines can be connected to one or 
more of these networks.  VMware gives us the ability, with 
very little hardware, to implement and experiment with 
complex network and host combinations that otherwise would 
be difficult and costly to create in a classroom or lab setting 
[4].  
 VYATTA is an open source router implemented on the 
Linux operating system which is also available as a VMware 
virtual machine.  It can provide several network services such 
as DHCP, DNS, NTP and NAT as well as conventional 
routing between as many physical or virtual networks as are 
available. The VYATTA NAT solution is a layered service in 
much the same manner as the Cisco layered NAT facility [5].  





 nat  { 
  rule 1 { 
   outbound-interface eth0 
   source { 
    address 192.168.112.0/24 
   } 
   Type masquerade 





 In all scenarios, packets captured on the outside interfaces 
(network B) revealed that the inside network addresses 
(network A) were in fact being translated. This means that all 
of the traffic generated on network A appears to have come 
from the outside interface of R1. 
2.7 Methodology 
 For all three tests, we gave R2 a static route to R1 for 
network A. Once this was done, we simply pinged from host 
to host in the different networks. The program “ping” 
generates ICMP echo request packets. As proof that a test 
succeeded or failed we looked for both traffic on the target 
network and an indication via the command shell that an 
ICMP echo response was received. This ensured that a host 
(and not a router interface) was responding to the ICMP echo 
request. 
2.8 The Results 
 In this section, a successful test is one in which the target 
was able to be pinged and proof that the response came from 
the intended target was obtained via packet capture. If there 
was no response, the test failed. The following matrix depicts 












1 (Cisco) S S S 
2 (Linksys) F F F 
3 (VMware) F F F 
4 (VYATTA) S S S 
 
 As can be seen, half of the tests resulted in successful pings 
to the internal “invisible” network hosts. Stated another way, 
half of all of the network devices did not protect/hide the 
internal devices. Both the Cisco router and the VYATTA 
virtual machine forwarded traffic to the internal network when 
asked to do so. Again, the RFC states that NAT should not be 
considered a security tool. Nonetheless, NAT is often placed 
in a security context. Examples can be seen on the Microsoft 
MSDN pages [6] and the Cisco FAQ pages about NAT [7]. 
Both of these devices can be given alternate configurations. 
 Once traffic was allowed to the network behind the NAT 
router, we were able to scan this network for additional 
security holes. This is because even though a scan or some 
other attempt at privilege escalation may be an attack, the 
routing for packets of this type is still handled in the exact 
same way. Once a host is identified as having security holes, it 
can be attacked directly. 
2.9 Mitigation 
 Since this particular exploit is not an attack per se, but rather 
taking advantage of the default behaviour of the NAT devices, 
the mitigation is also straight-forward. By placing filters 
prohibiting uninitiated traffic, the simple routing of inbound 
traffic is blocked. Additionally, there are several different 
methods that can be used when configuring NAT. The method 
used above (overload) translates all internal addresses as a 
single external address, does not filter any traffic and does not 
check for stateful connections. So, other implementations & 
configurations of NAT such as pools or one-to-one mapping 
may provide increased (or decreased) security. Lastly, some 
devices appear to “route first, NAT second” rather than try to 
determine if a packet should be allowed. What is critical is 
that when deploying a NAT device you must understand how 
it is going to behave. 
2.10 Educational Use 
 Academia is often hamstrung by a lack of hardware, funding 
and network resources, making it difficult to provide a hands-
on experience.  This experiment lends itself to a virtual 
environment allowing a single system to emulate a small 
networking lab. 
 In addition to NAT and security, this series of activities 
represents a collection of many basic networking concepts that 
are integral components to a small routed environment, both 
virtual and non-virtual. These include topics such as host and 
router based routing tables, route selection and the routing 
protocols. Basic network topics such as the address resolution 
protocol (ARP), Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), 
IP addressing, protocol models (TCP/IP), tools, traffic 
processing and the manipulation of header are key 
components to a background in networking and security. 
Students that completely understand these building blocks are 
well prepared for either a career in the communications 
industry or further research. Those that do not will have 
difficulty moving onward due to the fundamental nature of 
these ideas.  
 Topologies like the one depicted in figure 1 also allow 
students to explore some basic networking equipment and 
common exploits. Equally important to explore is the 
mitigation of the exploit. This gives them valuable insight into 
security problems seen in networks today and the associated 
solutions. In our program, security is a pervasive topic, 
appearing in almost every single one of our networking and 
systems administration classes. Student should learn that there 
are security problems in every aspect of our communication 
architecture. Experiments like those outlined here can better 
prepare them for their next step. 
 The use of virtual machines is a growing trend. Both server 
virtualization and virtual end nodes are growing trends. 
Educational programs can benefit because there is limited 
licensing and most of the virtual machines are open source. 
3 Conclusions 
 The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the potential 
security risks associated with network address translation and 
to discuss its’ importance in communications curricula. For 
these results, it is clear that many NAT devices or 
configurations are far from secure. The level of security is 
highly dependent on the configuration and the device. We 
believe that the vast proliferation of NAT devices and their 
ever increasing use justifies further investigation. 
Additionally, the work done by [8,9] indicates that peer to 
peer networking may serve to open even wider holes in what 
many assume to be a secure environment. The truth is that 
most consumers believe NAT to be inherently secure and this 
belief is supported by many technical articles. These problems 
make this re-examination even more important. As can be seen 
from the various scenarios and the tests outlined here, there 
are many implementations of NAT that are vulnerable to the 
most basic exploitation of simple routing. This has been 
demonstrated in both virtual and non-virtual environments. 
 In order to properly prepare students for industry or for 
research, a fundamental education of the networking concepts 
indicated in this paper is critical. A topology and experiments 
such as those outlined here will serve to provide this 
foundation. In addition, these experiments do not require vast 
resources and in fact can be done with little or no funding 
making them affordable for all programs. 
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